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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company, as assignee of
TMC CONTRACTORS, INC.,
SUPREME COURT # 40335
Plaintiff!Appellant,
Bingham County Case No.
CV -2009-1641

vs.
DRA W, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Defendant!Respondent.
And
KEVIN TAGGART, an Individual, CAMDEN
COURT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, AARON DEAN
EDDINGTON, an Individual, CITIZENS
COMMUNITY BANK and ALL OTHER
PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING INTEREST
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY,
Defendants.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
State ofldaho In and For the County of Bingham
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding

Attorney for Appellant
Kipp L. Manwaring
Manwaring Law Office, P.A.
381 Shoup Ave., Ste. 210
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Attorney for Respondent
J. Michael Whieler
THOMSEN STEVENS
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
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ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court erred in disregarding positive testimony found in the affidavit of

Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within Taylorview Development.
Draw argues that the district court did not disregard the positive testimony of Robert
Butler. Draw's argument is unsupported by the plain language ofthe district court's decision.
On reconsideration, Intermountain presented a two-pronged analysis to support its
position before the district court that it was entitled to foreclose its materialmen's lien against
Draw's parcel. Integral to both prongs was a factual determination that Draw's parcel was part of
Taylorview Development.
First, Intermountain argued that Draw owned - not merely was a servient estate holder of
- an easement on the private road that provided the access to all parcels within the Development.
Intermountain cited Idaho law stating that an owner of real property, which has an easement
interest in a road abutting that property, is subject to the claim of a materialmen's lien incurred
for the improvement of that easement.
Second, Intermountain argued that Shawn Allen as the developer fit within the statutory
language of being a person in charge of an improvement and held to be the agent of the owner
for purposes of the materialmen's lien statute.
The transcript of the hearing on Intermountain's motion for reconsideration illustrates the
exact factual and legal issues Intermountain presented to the district court.
Mr. Manwaring: Then, of course, as he identifies with the deed from
Timberline to Draw, LLC, Draw received this somewhat square portion of
Taylorview Development that is identified as storage units. I think that shows on
Exhibit A as well.
The Court: Right.
Mr. Manwaring: That is part of Taylorview Development. All of that is
part ofTaylorview Development.
*** As so for the summary judgment to
come and say, "Well, you're not part of Taylorview Development, and really,
you're just trying to collect" and so we get caught up in the agency argument, we
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just missed on the points that Intermountain has, and that is we have a lien. And
we think: that the Court needs to reconsider that. The facts now show that Draw,
LLC's parcel is within Taylorview Development.
***
And in this setting, Shawn Allen has this entire roadway paved. We're not
talking about the parking lot, because that doesn't apply to Draw. But we are
talking about this private road.
***
The first way that's [materialmen's lien] allowed by Idaho statute is, if
you are the agent in charge of the development - that's the language of the statue.
There's two ways under the statute to get a lien.
***
But in this case, you've got both aspects of the materialmen's lien statute
that apply here, because Taylorview Development was being developed by Shawn
Allen. And his affidavit says, "We went in and paved this private road, and that
private road is the access road for all of the parties who own parcels on that
property. "
***
... the second prong of the materialmen's lien.
And that is, if you are the agent in charge of development and you prepare
this development and someone buys a lot in your development, they are subject to
whatever lien claim you have because of the work you have performed that
benefits the property.
(Transcript on Motion/or Reconsideration, pp. 12-14)
Both prongs of Intermountain's legal arguments supporting its lien rights rest on a factual
determination of whether Draw's parcel is within Taylorview Development. If Draw's parcel is
part of Taylorview Development, then its easement through the Development was improved and
under 45-501, Shawn Allen was agent for Draw in making that improvement.
That portion of the district court's decision cited by Draw in its Respondent's Brief does
not counter Intermountain's position. In fact, Draw concedes the district court determined there
was a fact issue as to whether or not Draw's parcel lies within Taylorview Development.
More germane to the issue on appeal are the following determinations set forth in the
district court's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
In addition, the record does not reflect that Draw's Property lies within the
Taylorview Development. Draw has an easement over the roadway that lies
within the Taylorview Development, but the evidence in the record does not
support a finding that Draw's Property lies within the Taylorview Development.
(Clerk's Record, pp. 239-240).
***Thus, based upon the evidence in the record, at best, a fact issue remains
whether or not Draw's Property lies within the Taylorview Development.
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Assuming, however, that Draw's Property does lie within the Taylorview
Development, the record does not support a finding that Draw, as an owner on
one of the Taylorview parcels, consented to the paving or authorized the paving
through Taggart as Draw's alleged agent.
(Clerk's Record, p. 240).
Unquestionably, the district court ignored the positive testimony of Robert Butler in
reaching its decision that Draw's parcel was not within Taylorview Development. Further, the
district court acknowledged a fact issue existed as to whether Draw's parcel is within Taylorview
Development, an issue it created on its own.
Notwithstanding its disregard of Butler's testimony and its own acknowledgement of an
issue of fact, the district court went on to discuss general agency issues and not the two-pronged
analyses advanced by Intermountain. Instead the district court, and Draw on appeal, drifted from
the direct issue and diverged into an unrelated examination of whether Allen or Taggart or
anyone was Draw's agent. Had the district court made that factual finding as required by the
record before it on summary judgment, it could have avoided the needless discussion on general
agency principles.
Upon the required liberal construction of § 45-501 in favor of materialmen, the answer is
plainly stated: Allen or Taggart "shall be agents of the owner." BMC West Corp. v. Horkley,
144 Idaho 890, 893-94, 174 P.3d 399, 402-03 (2007).
Therefore, the district court's error in disregarding positive testimony proving Draw's
parcel was part of Taylorview Development is the critical issue on appeal. If the district court's
findings that the "black lines" are the boundary of the Development cannot be supported by
facts, then its decision must be vacated and remanded for further determination of the factual
issue.
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As noted in the Appellant's Brief, there are no facts supporting the district court's finding
that black lines on an assessor's plat or any other plat are the boundaries of Taylorview
Development. Just the opposite is true. Butler affirmatively testified that Draw's parcel is part of
Taylorview Development. Butler's testimony proves Draw's parcel consists of a specific lot on
the record of survey together with an undivided easement in a private road providing access
through the Development. The district court erred in disregarding that positive testimony.
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625, 603 P.2d 575,582 (1979).
Draw attempts to bolster the district court's decision through a strained reading of § 45501. Draw emphasizes the words "at the instance of the owner" found in the statute and then
wanders off track. Draw maintains that neither Allen nor Taggart "had ownership interest or
authority over Draw's unimproved property at the time of the paving. Therefore, Allen's
testimony could not establish 'that the private drive was paved at [Allen's] or Taggart's direction
as the developer and owner of the property' or that Allen and Taggart were 'person['s] having
charge' of Draw's property." (Respondent's Brief, p. 9).
That is not the language of the statute. Nor does it correctly set forth Intermountain's
position.
Draw's parcel was and is part of Taylorview Development. As such, there is no
requirement under the statute that Allen or Taggart have ownership interest in Draw's parcel or
in fact be the express agent of Draw. Simply put, § 45-501 deems a person having charge of an
improvement "shall be held to be the agent of the owner. ... " As developers of Taylorview
Development Allen and Taggart made improvements to the private road. Through that
improvement, either of them may be held to be the agent of Draw for purposes of the
materialmen's lien statute.

APPELLANTS ' REPLY BRIEF

4

Secondarily, by failing to find Draw's parcel lies within Taylorview Development, the
district court erroneously disregarded Intermountain's contention that improvement to Draw's
easement gives no basis in law for enforcement of a materialmen's lien.
Not only was Draw's parcel located within Taylorview Development, but also Draw by
deed was granted an easement interest in the private road. That private road was Draw's access
to the public street.
Draw challenges Intermountain's issue regarding improvement to the easement.
Specifically, Draw notes portions of the district court's order addressing the easement issue.
Dispassionate review of the district court's analysis on the easement question manifests the court
was awash in misunderstanding Draw's easement. For example, the district court observed:
Even if Draw has an easement over Taylorview's driveway, which is not
established in the record, Intermountain points to no law which would require a
dominate estate owner's payment, save for an express agreement, for the cost of
the servient estate owner's easement improvements.
(Clerk's Record, p. 193)
Obviously, the district court again disregarded the positive testimony of Butler
establishing Draw's parcel was part of Taylorview Development and the court ignored the plain
language in Draw's deed attached to Butler's affidavit. Draw's deed conveyed fee simple title to
the unimproved parcel "Together with and excepting therefrom an easement 24 feet in width,
lying 12 feet on both sides of the following described line: ... " (Clerk's Record, p. 227).
Consequently, Draw has both a dominant and servient estate. Draw's parcel is the
servient estate to the dominant easement interest of all other owners of property within
Taylorview Development. See generally Akers v. D.L. White Canst., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 301,
127 P.3d 204,204 (2005).
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Yet, Draw is the dominant estate regarding its easement along the private drive crossing
the property of all other owners within Taylorview Development. Butler's affidavit proved those
facts. Indeed, the private drive through Taylorview Development is Draw's access. Thus, Draw
as the dominant estate enjoys the benefits of all improvements made to the private drive and
under the district court's analysis has no obligation to pay for such improvements.
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Draw.
Where the record on appeal demonstrates that the district court did not correctly find the
facts leading to proper application of § 45-501 or the easement prong, remand is necessary. See
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990).
Waiver

Draw adds an additional issue in its Respondent's Brief asserting Intermountain waived
its right to argue the district court "failed to apply the clear language of § 45-50 I."
Draw's position misses the thrusts of Intermountain's argument. Draw's contention that
Intermountain waived the issue of the district court erring in applying § 45-501 begs the
question: If the district court's findings of fact support its conclusion that Draw's parcel is not
within Taylorview Development, then what's the issue?
Nevertheless and contrary to Draw's assertion, Intermountain has not waived any issue
on appeal.
Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R., provides that an appellant's failure to include in his initial
appellate brief a fair statement of an issue presented for review results in waiver
of the issue. However, we have stated this rule will be relaxed when the issue is
supported by argument in the briefs. State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111,952 P.2d
1245, 1247 (1998). Our statement in Crowe should have included the
qualification that the issue must be addressed in the appellant's opening brief.
Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R., requires that the opening brief "contain the contentions of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record
relied upon." Thus, we have repeatedly stated that we will not consider an issue
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not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Although an
appellant may file a reply brief, the reply brief may only present additional
argument in rebuttal to contentions advanced in the respondent's brief. I.A.R.
35(c).
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525,272 P.3d 491, 497 (2012).
In its opening brief, Intermountain presented argument with citations of authority and
references to transcripts and records on appeal, the question of whether the district court properly
applied § 45-501.
Thus, Intermountain has not waived any issue pressed with support in its opening brief.

B.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its attorney fees

under I.C. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial transaction between TMC and Draw.
Draw argues the district court correctly determined there was a commercial transaction
between TMC, or its assignee Intermountain, and Draw to support an award of attorney fees
under § 12-120(3). Both the district court and Draw misconstrue application of that section.
Under Draw's argument, § 12-120(3) applies in a vacuum: any allegation of a
commercial transaction not only triggers, but also mandates, an award of fees. Nothing in
Idaho's case law supports that theory. Regardless of whether a party alleges a commercial
transaction, the law requires that in fact a commercial transaction between parties is established
in order to apply § 12-120(3).
Draw relies upon language it cites from Garner v. Pavey, 151 Idaho 462, 470, 259 P.3d
608,616 (2011). However, Garner does not bestow fees as Draw asserts.

Great Plains thus attempted to clarify that a mere request for attorney fees
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), without more, is not sufficient to trigger the
commercial transaction prong of that section. In other words, neither a claim or
request in the prayer of a complaint for fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), nor a request
or claim for attorney fees in a memorandum of costs and fees, is sufficient to
trigger application of that fee provision. A party seeking fees based an a mere
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
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request under Ie. § 12-120(3) must show that a commercial transaction was the
gravamen of the action before a court may award fees. However, allegations in
the complaint that the parties entered into a commercial transaction and that the
complaining party is entitled to recover based upon that transaction, are
sufficient to trigger the application ofIe. § 12-120(3).
It is true that a fee award was denied to Northwest Pipeline (NWP), the prevailing
party in Great Plains, even though the losing party, Cate-Idaho, had claimed it
was entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) with regard to an unjust
enrichment claim, upon which it subsequently failed to recover. 136 Idaho at 472,
36 P.3d at 224 ("In this case, attorney fees were requested for the separate claim
of unjust enrichment pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3), and the gravamen of that claim
was a commercial transaction."). However, the Court held that attorney fees were
not available under that statute because "[tJhere was no transaction between the
subcontractors and NWP. "
1d. (Emphasis added).
Because there was no commercial transaction between those two parties, the
Fergusons cannot rely on the commercial transaction prong ofl.C. § 12-120(3) to
claim fees. See Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735
(2011) (fees are available under the commercial transaction prong of Ie. § 12120(3) "so long as a commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing
party and the party from whom that party seeks fees. ").
.
Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 778,264 P.3d 400, 417
(2011)(emphasis added).

Recent pronouncements from the Idaho Supreme Court give further clarification to the
question of awards of attorney fees in commercial transactions. "We today make clear that, in
order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the transaction
for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 744, 274 P.3d 1256,
1269 (2012). "Reynolds retained Trout Jones for the purpose of facilitating the purchase of real
property for commercial purposes. Trout Jones entered into the relationship for commercial, not
altruistic, purposes. Therefore, this transaction had the 'symmetry of commercial purpose
necessary to trigger I.C. § 12-120(3).'" Reynolds v. Trout Jones, Idaho Supreme Court 2013 Slip
Opinion No.7 (January 23, 2013)(emphasis added), citing Carillo, supra.
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There was no commercial transaction between TMC and Draw. Draw certainly did not
enter into any relationship for commercial purposes with TMe. The facts unmistakably show no
transaction, commercial or otherwise, occurred between TMC and Draw.
The district court erred in awarding to Draw some of attorney fees.

e.

Intermountain is entitled to an award of costs on appeal.
Draw correctly points out a mistake in Intermountain's opening brief where citation to

incorrect rules were made for an award of costs on appeal.
Intermountain mistakenly cited I.A.R. 41 and 35(b)(5) as the basis for an award of costs
on appeal. The correct rule is I.A.R. 40.
Accordingly, Intermountain seeks an award of its costs on appeal as provided in I.A.R.
40(a). Intermountain is not seeking an award of attorney fees on appeal.

D.

Draw is not entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal.
In accordance with I.e. § 12-120(3), Draw seeks an award of its costs and attorney fees

on appeal.
As already discussed in the preceding issue involving the award of fees by the district
court, Draw was not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under § 12-120(3). The same
analysis applies on appeal. Draw did not enter into any commercial transaction with TMC or
Intermountain for purposes of awarding attorney fees on appeal.
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CONCLUSION

The district court's order denying Intermountain's motion to reconsider and its previously
entered Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment should be vacated together
with the subsequent certified Final Judgment and amended judgment awarding fees.
The case should be remanded to the district court.
Intermountain has not waived any issues on appeal.
Intermountain is entitled to an award of its costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal.
Draw is not entitled to an award of its costs and attorney fees on appeal.
Dated this

3L!7 day of January 2013.

Kipp . Manwaring
Attorney for Appellant
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